In this article, I will outline, how three meaning theoretic paradigms deal with the content of belief, and what difficulties each of them faces: the Fregean approach, the Neo-Russellian or direct reference approach, and the dualist approach as a mixture of both. The Fregean approach stipulates senses that correspond to linguistic expressions and fulfill various roles such as determining the truth-conditions of a sentence or encoding cognitive value. The direct reference approach can be traced back up to John Stuart Mill's treatment of proper names, and it is also a part of Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance. In this view, the meaning of a simple assertoric statement can be described as a singular proposition, i.e. an ordered n-tuple consisting of the objects denoted by referential expressions and the relation holding between them.
the entities output by M , and considerable efforts have been made to get to a notion of sentence-meaning that allows C to be the identity relation. However, taking sentencemeaning as a direct relatum in someone's belief is by no means an obligatory way of dealing with the content of belief, and at first glance it doesn't seem to be a very natural way either. At least to me, it seems that the most obvious, natural way wouldn't make C output a sentence meaning, but rather some individual entity belonging to the realm of a believer's mind, e.g. a state of her mind, something that is present-consciously or not-as long as the belief lasts and that is a part of empirical, episodal thinking. Isn't that what Fregean senses are for? The answer is an emphatic 'No!'. *** As is well known, Frege held the view that senses belong to a third realm. They are neither material objects, nor are they part of empirical psychology, 3 and a large part of 'Der Gedanke' (1918) is dedicated to a refutation of psychologism as well as to establish a sort of naive realism. Still, the sense of a complete sentence can be 'grasped' as a thought by a person's empirical thinking, and since a sentence embedded in a belief statement denotes a sense instead of a truth-value, a belief statement is indeed analyzed as a relation between the believer and the sense of the embedded sentence. However, the sense is not in the believer's mind; rather, the believer is grasping it in his episodal thinking under the belief attitude. The apparently obscure nature of 'grasping' senses is constantly raising objections in philosophical seminars throughout the world, but it might not be as obscure as it appears at first glance. It can be thought of as another example of the type-token dichotomy. The sense of a sentence is a type that is only exemplified by a particular episodal thought in empirical thinking, and so the sense itself certainly cannot be in any way part of empirical thinking, just like the type of a word cannot be part of its utterance. If this view is coherent with Frege's theory, as I'd like to propose here, then there is nothing particularly obscure about grasping senses. The obscurity of grasping senses can be traced back to the fact that we generally don't have a proper theoretical understanding of the type-token dichotomy, although there are no severe problems in distinguishing between types and tokens in practice.
However, Frege's analysis of belief cannot be an instance of Scheme 1. According to Frege, the ordinary meaning of a sentence is its truth value, and the ordinary meaning of a referential expression is its referent. 4 Thus, the fact that a sentence embedded in a belief statement has a sense as its meaning is extraordinary. An extraordinary or 'odd' meaning of the embedded sentence is triggered by an attitude verb, hence Frege proposes an ambiguity theory of belief ascriptions. So in this case, the meaning M depends not only on the sentence, but also on a feature of the embedding attitude. Let this feature or its absence be one of {+odd, −odd}, and let M (x, y) be a revised twoplace meaning function. This yields a second scheme:
(Scheme 2) B(a, C(M (S, +odd)))
The values of M are senses for +odd and truth values for −odd. But isn't the truth value determined by the sense of an expression anyway, such that there needs to be a sense of a sentence in its ordinary meaning at first hand, that in turn determines the truth value? While this is certainly true in respect to a person's grasping of a thought, which is an epistemic process, it is still the case that Frege considered the ordinary meaning of a sentence to be a truth value, and so there is a direct connection of a sentence to the empirical world. According to Frege, the ordinary meaning of a referential expression is the referent of that expression, e.g. 'Venus' means the Venus, and not the sense of 'Venus'. 5 Perhaps this wasn't the wisest choice of words, and instead of 'meaning' (Bedeutung), Frege had better been talking about 'denotation' (Bezug). But how does a Neo-Russellian deal with this issue? *** Consider Scheme 1 again, and suppose that M outputs a singular proposition like (1) b, P consisting of an object b and a property P , for a sentence like the following popular example: 6 (2) Superman can fly.
If Superman doesn't exist, the whole sentence is false because the underlying existence presupposition isn't fulfilled, but in case he exists, (1) would be a suitable representation for the meaning of (2) . But isn't this rather similar to what Frege has considered as the even meaning of an expression, before we exchanged 'meaning' with 'denotation'? If so, then it seems that from a Fregean point of view, a strict Neo-Russellian mixes up meaning with sense, or, in modern terminology, mixes up denotation with meaning. To some extent, this critique even applies to Russell (1963) himself, because he allows singular propositions as a description of meaning, if a person holding an attitude towards such a meaning was fully acquainted with the objects in a singular proposition. It must be noted, however, that in Russell's opinion full acquaintance with the objects in a singular proposition cannot be achieved, because we are only acquainted with partial sense data. 7 Still, Russell has nothing to object in principal to allowing particulars to be part of intensional entities. For Frege, this is a categorical mistake. Given that Superman exists, how can an actual, empirical object like him-the guy that is harder than steel, so your car crashes when you accidently rush into him-ever combine with a concept like being able to fly, except for the first entity falling (metaphorically) under the latter? Frege can't accept that two entities of a completely different ontological sort can form some new entity. This is the main disagreement between Frege and Russell in his early phase. 8 As for singular terms, a singular proposition correctly catches ordinary Fregean meaning, i.e. denotation, insofar as it includes the objects these expressions denote, but it fails to specify a person's epistemic access to those objects. In a Fregean approach, this is the role of senses mediating between expressions and referents. Despite all of Frege's dedication to metaphysical realism, this view seems to be inspired by an inherently anti-realist position, namely, that there can be no complete presentation of a particular, since an object is always given to a person in a partial way.
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To put it in more drastic words, neither the Venus nor Superman can be in someone's head.
While a Neo-Russellian refutes Fregean senses because of their unclear ontological nature and the problems related to grasping a sense, a Fregean might in turn have good reasons to reject singular propositions, as they do not even try to tell us how a person actually encounters and deals with particular objects in her experience, apart from being related to them in a directly referential way. Indeed, it is far from being clear how to read a belief relation between a person and a singular proposition. The belief in question is de re, i.e. about an object, because the singular proposition contains the logical subject as an object. However, from an epistemic point of view, there are various ways of accessing an object. Consider Superman. Lois Lane might have heard about him from a colleague (perhaps Clark Kent told her about Superman's latest achievements), she might have read about him in the newspaper, she might have seen him on television or she has already met him in propria persona, because he saved her, when she was inadvertently falling off a skyscraper. In all of those cases, she might hold quite different views about Superman in addition to believing that he can fly. The problem is, of course, that she even has a certain de re attitude towards Superman if she has never recognized him as Superman. Lois Lane sees Clark Kent daily, and she believes that he's a nice guy, but quite a jerk as well, and she wouldn't really want to date with him. She also believes that (3) is the case. Clark Kent can't fly.
So if the object of Lois Lane's belief was an unmodified singular proposition, she would be in a contradictory belief state: Whenever the output of C is a singular proposition, (5) and (4) can have different truth values, such that under a referentially opaque reading the substitutability of 'Superman' for 'Clark Kent' and vice versa can be blocked. This is the problem of referential opacity. These problems are well known and don't need to be further explained here. One solution to them involves changing C. Instead of taking C as an identity mapping, it can be made dependent on the speaker, such that Lois Lanes' belief is specified by a scheme as follows.
The content of belief now might be represented by some entity based on a de re sentence meaning, e.g. a singular proposition, plus some specification of the way α, in which the referent of a singular term in S is given to the speaker:
This is a dualist theory, because the sentence meaning differs from the content of belief. 11 While the meaning of the embedded sentence can be specified as a singular proposition, or, alternatively, as the set of possible worlds at which the singular proposition would be true, the content of belief additionally contains entities representing the way an object is given to a person. The crucial question is, however, wether such an additional way of being given really needs to enter into the analysis of the content of belief, and what kind of entity it ought to be from an ontological point of view. Is it a 'vivid name' (Kaplan 1985, pp. 360) ? Is it an individual concept as Perry (1979) discusses and rejects? More generally, is it an individual, psychological or rather some abstract, sense-like entity ? At the risk of disappointing you, I won't dare to provide a definite answer to these questions. Instead, let me continue a general discussion of the approaches outlined so far. To further complicate things, let's introduce indexicals. *** Suppose that Clark Kent tries to impress Lois Lane and says:
Clark Kent: I am Superman.
Regardless of the truthness or falsehood of this claim, a theory of meaning must provide an account for indexical expressions like 'I' as in (9). As it seems, a model for the content of one's belief must a fortiori deal with indexicals as well. For a meaning theory, indexicals pose at least two difficulties. First, a meaning theory must deal with the obvious context-dependency of indexicals. Second, there's the problem of the essential indexical, as it has been put forward by Geach (1957) , Castañeda (1967) , Perry (1979) and various other authors. Let's take a look at the first difficulty. As far as pure context-dependency is concerned, a solution is straightforward, although it can be tricky in detail. Logical languages like those of Kaplan (1989) , Richard (1990) , and more recently Schlenker (2003) have no problem in dealing with contexts of utterances in principle. Contexts are taken as objects with a certain structure incorporating a speaker of the respective utterance, one or more addressees, a time of utterance and the place of utterance. A sentence is then evaluated in respect to a context of utterance. In the informal notation used here, that means that M is taken as a two-place function M * (x, y) from sentences and contexts to the meaning of a sentence in a context, and a 3-place function for Scheme 2 respectively. So far we have silently presupposed that the meaning of partial expressions must combine in a regular manner to the meaning of a whole sentence, and if such a compositionality principle indeed holds, then the partial (even) meaning of 'I' in (9) with respect to a context of utterance c would be just the respective denotatum b, i.e. Superman.
What about the content of belief? According to Scheme 1, the partial content of belief yields b again, since the proposed content of belief is just a singular proposition, C being an identity mapping. According to Scheme 2, believing triggers feature +odd, and so the result has to be a sense. Again, C does not change anything. According to Scheme 3, the output of M * is the same as the output in Scheme 1, but C now takes the believer into account, and the partial belief content now consists of b plus some way b is given to b (since b is also the believer, provided that Clark Kent really is Superman). Anyway, contexts may be added to any of the schemes.
This can of course not be the whole story. There is a number of adequacy criteria that need to be fulfilled by a formal system dealing with contexts. For example, different occurrences of a demonstrative like 'that' must be able to denote different entities in the same context of utterance, and if the main thesis of Schlenker (2003) is empirically correct, certain indexicals in certain languages need to be evaluated relative to the context of the reported speech act instead of the context of the actual utterance, when they occur within the scope of attitude verbs. However, none of the suggested schemes has principal, immanent problems with incorporating contexts. From a more pessimistic point of view, you could also say that after it has been enriched with contexts, each of the schemes faces the same problems as before. Scheme 1 suffers from ontologico-categorical eclecticism in combination with under-determination of a believer's epistemic access to particulars. Scheme 2 suffers from platonic entity inflation in combination with notorious difficulties of explaining what senses really are. And finally, Scheme 3 is a bastard that combines a sort of ontologico-categorical eclecticism with an inflation of entities that can be of various sorts (depending on the respective author's preferences). Dealing with contexts is none of these problems.
Contrary to this claim, Perry (1977) has argued that Fregean senses aren't suitable to represent the meaning of indexicals, so something must be said to justify the converse thesis proposed here with respect to Scheme 2. Perry writes:
He [Frege] probably supposed that context supplies not just an object, but somehow a completing sense. There seems to be no place for such a sense to be found, save in the mind of the person who apprehends the thought expressed by the sentence. But to understand such a sentence, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to have grasped, and associated with the value of the demonstrative, any such sense. Frege's appeal to incommunicable senses in the case of "I", is probably an implausible attempt to deal with these problems. (Perry 1977, pp. 496-497) This argument by plausibility can be discarded, once a purely Fregean perspective has been adopted. According to Frege, features of the context do not determine a thought, a context does not supply a completing sense for a thought. Conversely, an already complete thought can be expressed by a sentence plus some features of the context. 12 Just like words, the relevant features of the context are means of thought expression, not means of thought determination. In turn, a listener must in some way be epistemically hooked up with the referent of an indexical token, and such an epistemic connection must be represented by a sense, because the object itself cannot be grasped as a whole. If two speakers are epistemically connected to a particular in the same way, they have grasped the same, type-identical thought. Otherwise, the grasped thoughts might differ, hence they might differ in truth-value as well, but who knows? Perhaps nobody. This suggests that Frege simply has a much stricter view about understanding indexicals in mind than Perry, a view that is built upon epistemological grounds, whereas Perry focuses on much looser conditions of proper language use and understanding. From a point of view of proper language use, a speaker does not need to be able to provide a substitute expression that exactly specifies the way in which a feature of the context is given to him, in order to use or understand an indexical, and so the stipulation of a corresponding individual sense seems to be implausible. But from an epistemologically anti-realist point of view, a thought about an object has to include a way the object is given to the thinking person and cannot include the object itself, simply because it is considered to be a fact that an object is always given to her in a partial way. In this view, completing senses are not only plausible, they are mandatory, and nothing in this view suggests that the thinking person must be able to provide a substitute expression of any kind.
***
But what about essential indexicals? Since Perry (1979) has published his influential article, it has been widely acknowledged that some indexicals like 'I' are principally irreducible in thinking. Regarding 'I', the thesis boils down to the following. Whenever a person believes what she would express by a sentence containing 'I', there doesn't seem to be any substitute expression φ that would have the same explanatory power in respect to the person's behavior, unless the person additionally believes that she is the φ-er. For example, consider Clark Kent aka Superman. If Clark Kent suffers from amnesia-a very popular disease among analytical philosophers-, he might not believe that Clark Kent is Superman, but still believe what (9) expresses. The argument can be extended to arbitrary substitute expressions and even direct acquaintance. Clark Kent might look at himself in a mirror without recognizing that it's himself, and come to believe that the guy he's looking at certainly cannot be Superman, but still believe that he himself is Superman. Likewise, he might be mistaken about any definite description as a replacement for 'I'; a definite description might actually pick out himself, but Clark Kent would still have to believe that it does so in order to start acting like Superman, whereas believing what (9) expresses seems to come along with a disposition to show the Superman-behavior without any further assumptions. One might object that the behavior in question isn't well-defined and cannot be precised sufficiently, but this is a rather weak argument. In case of Superman, there is a pretty good intuition of what it takes to act like him. Someone wearing rubber gloves and a blue training suit with the Superman-logo, in combination with a tendency to jump out of windows and either to crash on the ground (non-veridical belief) or to fly around skyscrapers (veridical belief), makes a pretty good example of the Superman-behavior.
The alleged irreducibility of some indexicals is one of the main arguments in favor of a dual aspect theory applying Scheme 3. Such a theory allows an ordinary, publicly accessible de re denotation of 'I' outside the scope of belief, whereas an additional, perhaps individual and purely psychological mode of presentation can be stipulated for referents of indexicals inside the scope of belief. On the other hand, both strict de re applications of Scheme 1 and the Fregean Scheme 2 are supposed to have problems with essential indexicals. Consider Scheme 1. As in this approach the content of a person's belief is a singular proposition, any expression that is co-referential to 'I' in the same context picks out the same constituent object in the proposition. Thus, a difference in behavioral dispositions of the believer cannot be explained by the proposed content of belief. The situation is less clear in respect to Scheme 2. The sense of expressions denoting the same object can indeed differ, and so it might serve in encoding the cognitive value of an expression, like in Frege's own 'the evening star = the morning star' example. But if for each sense, there is a linguistic expression it is the sense of, then the irreducibility comes into play again, because the believer would have to additionally believe that he's the one that is picked out by the replacement sense. So the problem seems to be that either there would need to be senses that aren't senses of a certain linguistic expression, such that language would in principle be incomplete in relation to thinking, or individual senses would need to be stipulated with each use of an essential indexical, such that each of those senses would be the sense of a linguistic expression, but each of those replacement expressions would just be a replacement for a particular use of the indexical in question, while it might fail to have the same explanatory power as the indexical in respect to the believer on another occasion of the indexical's use. As for the first possibility, previous considerations suggest that an individual I-sense would have to be the special way in that a person a person has epistemic access to herself, and so there would be a bridge between natural language semantics and first person authority. So we could de-dust the long-abandoned Cartesian cogito and find a new place for it in a sort of infallible, semantically-inspired I-thought awareness. Here is not the place to discuss it, but I don't think that there is any first person authority, and therefore a bridge from semantics to first person authority would lead to nowhere. Be this as it may be, a stipulation of senses that aren't senses of expressions ought to be rejected on purely methodical grounds, because they would be ad hoc entities like phlogiston-unobservable entities that cannot be properly identified except for their functional role in the theory. Fortunately, it is possible to avoid inexpressible senses because the second possibility offers a Fregean solution to Perry's puzzle. As has been discussed before in dealing with contexts, there is no reason why there necessarily can't be an individual sense on each occasion of a use of an indexical, but no such sense in general. When someone believes something about himself, he must in some way or another be hooked up with himself in his thinking, but this epistemic connection does not need to be the same each time one thinks about himself. To Perry, this seems to be implausible, but then again, it looks more plausible from a Fregean point of view, if you take into account an epistemic interpretation of senses. Why should a disposition to utter a sentence containing 'I' and to act accordingly correspond one-to-one with exactly one way in which an arbitrary speaker thinks of himself? The structure of Perry's argument suggests that whenever we find an expressible way α a person thinks of herself in episodal thinking, we can find a counter-example in which α fails to explain that person's behavioral dispositions, while the person could still think of herself with an I-thought. But this argument can just be reversed. If the expected behavior, that indicates an I-thought and respective dispositions to act, is displayed, then there must have been an expressible way α the person has been thinking episodically of herself. It is worth noting that in this context, 'expressible' can only mean expressible by language in general, which does not entail that the respective believer must be able to express it when he holds the belief.
To summarize, Scheme 2 does not have more problems with essential indexicals than Scheme 3. This ought not be surprising, given the fact that Scheme 3 is just a variation of Scheme 2 that takes senses as modes of presentation of particulars and restricts them to the content of belief as opposed to pure sentence meaning. Scheme 1, on the other hand, seems to be both insufficient regarding co-referential terms and regarding problems like the one exemplified by (2)-(6), as well as insufficient for adequately dealing with the problem of the essential indexical. *** So far, no word has been lost on the question of which of the schemes to choose. There is no doubt that in order to answer this question, possible candidates for the content of belief and meaning-constituting entities would have to be explored further. But this can only be done relative to some clear adequacy criteria, which in turn will be relative to the explanatory and descriptive goals that our theory is bound to pursue. There is not enough room here to discuss those criteria and goals, or even come to a definite conclusion which scheme to choose. In lack of space, I can only present two perspectives on belief and show how they are connected with each other.
From a linguistic perspective, the desired theory should explain how the meaning of the embedded sentence combines with the meaning of the partial matrix sentence to form the meaning of a complete belief ascription. For example, it has to explain what role the meaning of 'Superman can fly' plays in determining the meaning of the belief ascription: (10) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.
From a prima facie extra-linguistic perspective, the theory ought to provide a description of the content of relational belief that is sufficient to account for a person's behavior, e.g. Lois Lane's behavior when she believes that Superman can fly, as opposed to her lack of belief that he does so, or even her lack of beliefs about Superman at all, or her belief that Clark Kent cannot fly. The crucial question is then, wether our theory is bound to be a theory of both of those perspectives or not, and, in a second step, which adequacy criteria have to be chosen in order to make the theory appropriate for the given task. However, the linguistic and extra-linguistic perspectives are connected with each other by a doctrine of truth-conditional semantics, namely, that a person understands a sentence, when she knows under which conditions the sentence would be true.
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Suppose that the truth-conditional doctrine is correct. Then the description of the meaning of a sentence has to specify the truth-conditional content of that sentence. In turn, a person understands the sentence when she knows under which conditions this truth-conditional content would be true. Since a singular proposition can be taken as a specification of the conditions under which a sentence would be true, the knowledge a person needs to have in order to understand a sentence can be specified as a relation between the person and the singular proposition representing the truth-conditional content. But this relation in question cannot be genuine knowledge, since this would entail that the singular proposition in question is actually true. Knowledge of the truthness or falsehood of a sentence is of course not a condition for its understanding, and so the desired relation must be much weaker. It must specify the ability of a person to decide, given some actual or imaginary state of affairs, wether the predication specified by the singular proposition holds or not. So for example, Lois Lane understands 'Superman can fly' iff. she has the ability to decide of any actual or imaginary state of affairs, wether in this state a would have the property P or not. But if this analysis is correct, it seems that relational belief is not much different from understanding. The main difference between the two relations is that instead of just being able to decide of any real or imaginary state of affairs of the world, wether a given predication holds or not, the person judges that the actual state of affairs is such that the given predication holds. As far as I can see, this is the main motivation behind choosing Scheme 1 in combination with singular propositions, or alternatively, propositions as possible worlds, as a model for someone's belief. In order for a belief ascription like (10) to become true, Loise Lane would need to be able to decide of the world how she perceives it, wether Superman can fly or not. In a possible-worlds framework, this presupposes that she is able to partition the total set of possible worlds into the worlds in which Superman can fly and into the worlds in which Superman cannot fly or doesn't exist. Sure enough, a singular proposition consisting of Superman and the property of being able to fly can serve in specifying such a partitioning, as it determines a set of possible worlds in which Superman can fly, the rest being those in which he can't fly. Believing that Superman can fly then adds the condition that the singular proposition holds in all possible worlds compatible with Lois Lane's belief.
Given these considerations, there is some problem with Scheme 2 and 3. If the truth-conditional doctrine is correct and singular propositions catch the truth-conditions of a sentence, then according to Scheme 2 and 3, a person could believe something, while at the same time not knowing the full truth-conditions of the sentence embedded in the belief ascription expressing the belief. Both schemes specify a certain way of how particular objects are given, thereby allowing Lois Lane to believe that Clark Kent can't fly as well as that Superman can fly, or allowing Clark Kent to believe that he himself is Superman as well as that the guy in the mirror is not Superman, without holding contradictory beliefs. Be it senses or some addition to a singular proposition, what they believe in both cases is more fine-grained than what the singular proposition itself encodes. At first glance this doesn't seem to be a problem, because the believer might speak another language. Perhaps Lois Lane only speaks Hungarian, so why should she know what 'Superman can fly' means anyway? However, if a singular proposition specifies the truth-conditional content of one sentence, then it also specifies the truthconditional content of any correct translation of that sentence into any language you may choose. So Lois Lane does not only not need to know what 'Superman can fly' means, when she believes that Superman can fly, she doesn't even need to know what any correct translation of 'Superman can fly' means. The same for Clark Kent and 'I am Superman' translated into whatever language you choose, including Clark Kent's mother tongue. To the Fregean, this critique is not an immanent objection, because the embedded sentence has +odd meaning, and this meaning is a sense. As a speaker might grasp one sense, e.g. that of 'Superman', but not the sense of 'Clark Kent', although both expressions denote the same object, it is clear that the truth-conditions the speaker gets to know are only partial. It is an empirical process to find out that two proper names denote the same object. In the proposed interpretation of Frege, we can only know partial truth-conditions of a sentence, because particulars are always given to us in a partial way from an epistemic point of view, given some sort of epistemic anti-realism, while maintaining metaphysical realism. So it can be assumed that a strong truth-conditional doctrine in its early-Wittgenstein-shape is not in line with Frege's opinions about the matter. Despite his avowal to realism, Frege has to concede that understanding a sentence doesn't require knowing its truth-conditions as a whole; a step that brings him much closer to Husserl than he might have liked, but otherwise does no harm to his theory. Things look different regarding Scheme 3, though. If in this account the meaning of a sentence is taken as a singular proposition, whereas the content of belief is enriched by some individual way the particular objects are given to the believer, then it becomes mysterious why a believer would understand the embedded sentence (or any correct translation of it), while at the meantime being in a belief relation to a much more restricted content of belief. Understanding as knowing the truth-conditions of the embedded sentence (or any correct translation) would already presume Lois Lane's ability to decide of any actual or imaginary state of affairs, wether Superman can fly or not, independently from any way Superman is given to her. But then a restriction of her belief to some ways in which particular objects are given to her no longer makes sense. Either the truth-conditional doctrine needs to be revised, or it must be argued that singular propositions don't catch the truth conditions of sentences, or the relation between belief and understanding outlined above must be weakened in such a way that believing does no longer require a person to fully understand the sentence embedded into the belief ascription or any translation of it.
As it happens, I take it for granted that singular propositions indeed catch the truth conditions of sentences like 'Superman can fly' or 'I am Superman' (relative to a given context of utterance). The reason for this commitment is straightforward: Truth is a transcendent notion. A sentence can be true without anyone knowing so, and so there's no reason why the conditions under which a sentence becomes true would involve ways how objects are given to someone. A simple assertoric statement like 'Superman can fly' is true iff. Superman can fly. People might think of the referent of 'Superman' in quite a different way than they think of the referent of 'Clark Kent', but if 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' denote the same person, then any sentence containing the first expression has the exact same truth-conditions as the same sentence with the second expression substituted for the first one. If Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can't fly, and 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' denote the same person-the one that sometimes wears a handsome business suit, but at another time wears a silly training suit and rubber gloves-, then her belief about Clark Kent aka Superman is simply false: Clark Kent can fly.
14 So a defender of a dual aspect theory has to give up the truth-conditional doctrine or the claim that one has to understand p prior to believing that p, but in order to account for the truthness or falsehood of belief he cannot give up the view that singular propositions (or equivalent theoretical notions) determine the truth-conditions of a sentence. Suppose a believer wouldn't need to understand the embedded sentence or any translation of it. Then he might not understand what he says when he expresses what he believes. Perhaps we all don't really understand what we say most of the time? I think that this view is too harsh. It doesn't seem to be part of a speaker's linguistic competence at all to know arbitrary ways of how objects are given to various speakers. A fortiori, this applies to indexicals, since in this case the way an object is being given to a speaker is determined by purely contingent features of the context of utterance. So the dual aspect theorist better ought to follow the Fregean path and weaken the truth-conditional doctrine itself. Understanding a sentence does not always require knowing its truth conditions as a whole. To conclude, schemes 1-3 differ not only in the notion of belief itself, they also differ in respect to the acceptance of either a strong or a weakened truth-conditional doctrine of understanding sentences.
*** Consider Lois Lane uttering (3). In one sense, she doesn't understand what she has said, because she doesn't realize that there are two different ways in which one and the same person is presented to her. Respectively, she holds the contradictory belief that Superman can fly and cannot fly. Let's call this variant realist belief. In another sense, she understands what she has said, because she has good reasons to believe that the person she calls 'Clark Kent' cannot fly, and in the meantime she has good reasons to believe that the person she calls 'Superman' can fly. Respectively, she holds the non-contradictory belief that the person she perceives as Superman can fly and that the person she perceives as Clark Kent cannot fly. This belief is non-contradictory, because according to her belief the persons in question aren't identical. Let's call this variant anti-realist belief. Which version is the right one? As mentioned before, there can be no general answer to this question, because the answer depends on a choice of the phenomena that the semantic theory is bound to explain, a choice that is constantly being suppressed in this article. But apart from this choice, the answer also depends on the possibly silent presumptions of the theory. If you presume epistemic anti-realism in regards of particulars, then a realist notion of belief cannot be adequate, even if metaphysical, non-epistemic realism is additionally presumed in order to catch transcendent truth. In this case, realist belief cannot be adequate, because it already presupposes a strong notion of understanding referential expressions that is not compatible with the anti-realist thesis that epistemic access to particulars is always partial. This is one of the presumptions of Frege's theory of senses. Particulars are always just given to someone in a particular way. On the other hand, you may presume epistemic realism in regards of particulars. This point of view idealizes from the fact that we don't perceive complete objects and allows an ideal language to talk about attitudes as relations between persons and objects themselves. Then, an anti-realist notion of belief regarding particulars is too fine-grained, if meanwhile a strong notion of understanding sentences is maintained.
Given these considerations, the central problem of modeling the content of belief is identified. Relative to the descriptive and explanatory goals of the theory, which specification of a person's access to particulars is needed? In the way that has been outlined so far, this question is intimately connected to a question about the very foundation of semantics itself. What does it take to understand a sentence in a given context of utterance? By a truth-conditional doctrine, this question is tied to the distinction between epistemic realism and epistemic anti-realism in the following way. If singular propositions or alternative formal constructions that include particulars indeed specify truth conditions as suggested, then a weakened truth-conditional doctrine is no longer a truth-conditional doctrine at all, for the purpose of weakening it is exactly to detach understanding from the actual truth conditions. So the claim is in fact: We do not need to know the truth conditions of a sentence in order to understand it. What-as we may ask now-do we need to know in order to understand a sentence in a given context? It seems to me that the answer to this question must be taken from the inventory of good old philosophical anti-realism in its epistemic variant. Certainly a person cannot just think in an arbitrary way about particulars given to her, when she is bound to understand a sentence involving referential expressions. For example, Lois Lane's way of thinking of Superman cannot be the Spiderman-way if she understands (2) , and her way of thinking about Clark Kent cannot be the Joe Dummy-way 15 if she understands (3). Instead, in both cases the way she's thinking of Superman must be a finite presentation of the actual Superman (or the Superman-noumenon, if you insist in talking this way). Such different finite presentations of one and the same object have been the domain of classic anti-realism for centuries. So despite various linguistic criteria that also have to be taken into account-proper names and indexicals are rigid designators, proper names have no descriptive content, and so on-, a supporter of anti-realist belief has to deal with the classic anti-realist problem of representing partial presentations of particulars.
My suggestion is then, to go on and find a description for presentations of particulars to persons that is as general and principal as it can be. Senses are senses of expressions, and so the sense of an expression like 'Superman' is primitive and not complex. But it can be argued convincingly that the way a particular is present in someone's thinking is complex. Senses also require some dubious ontological commitment. Psychological modes of presentation, on the other hand, might have an empirical counterpart in someone's empirical thinking, but then they are too individual. It seems to me, that they are only a modern and more trendy counterpart of one's imaginations and therefore attract some natural suspicions about psychologism. Vivid names aren't complex either, and it doesn't seem to be quite clear what they are anyway. There are numerous further entities that might serve as a candidate, but allow me take a shortcut and make some suggestion. I believe that finite presentations of particulars must be represented by the same mechanism that represents infinite presentations of particulars. By this, I mean the following. In the footsteps of metaphysical realism, an object can be the logical subject of as many predications as you like. Some of them are true, some of them are false. However, the object itself is fully transcendent: it is completely specified by all predications that are true of it, nothing less and nothing more. I take it that there are infinitely many predications that are true of any arbitrary object. Take a set of such predicates, and you have an infinite presentation of a particular. Take a finite subset of such a set, and you get a finite presentation of a particular. By no means I want to suggest that it is mandatory to adopt a trope theory with all of its philosophical and ontological impact, but I'd like to suggest that the mechanism of predication is the most appropriate way to encode finite presentations of objects. In other words, I claim that ways in which objects are given must be represented by predicates that are held to be true by someone of some transcendent object. This is a minimum condition on a representation of the way how something is given to someone. Why should it be satisfied? First, it warrants that behavioral dispositions are specified in a way that is sufficiently complex. For Lois Lane's attitude towards Clark Kent or Clark Kent's attitude to himself as opposed to the guy in the mirror are attitudes that go hand in hand with a vast variety of dispositions to act such-and-such. If actions need to be explained, like the problem of the essential indexical and some puzzles around referential opacity suggest, a person's complex concept about the referent of a singular term must be taken into account, and not just a primitive way of being given. Second, a failure to understand the predicative use of an expression is almost always a failure in linguistic competence, whereas the opposite holds regarding singular terms from an anti-realist perspective on understanding and belief. Therefore, predicates are the proper logical means to describe a person's epistemic access to the world, where other terms might fail. Third, the way of talking about imaginary entities is in no way different from the way of talking about actual entities. In fact, we often have to find out wether the object we are talking about actually exists or not by looking at the world. From an anti-realist point of view, Lois Lane's two ways of Superman being given to her are beliefs about two different persons, unless Lois Lane finds out that they are the same. Perhaps she even concludes sometime that-contrary to the assumption throughout this paperSuperman doesn't exist, due to lack of evidence for his existence. But until she finds out, her talking about Superman and Clark Kent as of two distinct objects is in no way different than her talking about other objects. That's of course the reason why I have chosen the Superman example right from the start, at the risk of getting the objection that Superman is an imaginary entity. In many cases there is no difference between imaginary and actual objects in the way we talk about them, except that the former is imaginary and the latter is actual. 16 This lack of a difference must be reflected in a formal representation as well.
Interestingly, there might be a way to encode the desired presentations of objects in a varying domain modal logic, following a suggestion made quite some time ago by Hintikka (1962) . However, it requires a radical departure from schemes 1-3, as it introduces more of subjective meaning than any of them. Consider the following. In the worlds compatible with Lois Lane's belief, there must be two distinct objects. Lois Lane believes that one of them is called 'Superman', whereas the other one is called 'Clark Kent'. Likewise, there can be various other properties she holds true of her Superman, but not of her Clark Kent, and vice versa. Although this encoding would allow infinitely many properties being held true, it seems reasonable to limit them to a finite set of properties, given that Lois Lane only has finitely many dispositions to act such-and-such in respect to the two perhaps purely imaginary objects in question. The singular proposition consisting of Superman and the property of being able to fly specifies all worlds in which Superman can fly, and indeed in all of the worlds compatible with Lois Lane's belief Superman can fly. However, her presentation of Clark Kent is not identical with Superman, and so the same singular proposition cannot represent the way she perceives Superman as Clark Kent. Thus, her anti-realist belief involves a change in the denotation of 'Clark Kent' that reflects her ideolect, or as Hintikka puts it, her belief has to be analyzed as a case of multiple referentiality.
17 None of the schemes discussed can adequately represent this account, but this is nothing to worry about, since they only have served some informal explanatory purposes anyway. The goal is to find a formalization along the lines of this suggestion that fits the Neo-Russellian tradition, deals with indexicals as well, and has an amount of expressive power that is comparable to those of the dualist and Fregean schemes. The reasons for this choice go beyond of this article. Most of them are related to the desired adequacy criteria that have not been spelled out at this occasion and certainly will require highest attention, but one of them is also the kind of entity explosion promoted by Scheme 2 and 3. As far as I can see, the only way to get rid of entities like senses or modes of presentation
